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INTRODUCTION
From the early days of mandatory arbitration of statutory
claims—especially employment-discrimination claims—one major
critique has been the loss of transparency and publicity that attends a
shift from litigation in public courts to arbitration in private
tribunals.1 Given the lack of written, publicly available decisions and
the relative secrecy of arbitral proceedings, the diversion of legal
disputes from courts to arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”)2 threatens to stunt both the development of the law and
public knowledge of how the law is interpreted and applied in
important arenas of public policy.
Judith Resnik and others have shown that the presumed contrast
to litigation was in some ways overstated as litigation itself has
* © 2018 Cynthia Estlund.
** Catherine A. Rein Professor, New York University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Alexander Colvin, Samuel Estreicher, Mark Gough, Samuel
Issacharoff, David Sherwyn, and Katherine Stone for helpful comments on earlier drafts,
and Rachel Sommer for outstanding research assistance. All errors are my own.
1. See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A
Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 367,
378–83 (1992); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017,
1047 (1996).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
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dramatically receded from the public stage.3 Public trials in civil cases
have become nearly extinct, as the overwhelming majority of cases
are resolved either on dispositive motions (usually in unpublished
opinions) or out-of-court settlements. Settlements between private
parties often include non-disclosure provisions barring parties from
discussing anything about the case or its resolution.4
While it is important not to overstate the contrast between
arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of the
arbitral process is shielded from public view. In particular, the
plaintiff’s allegations are set out in a complaint that appears on a
public docket in litigation but not in arbitration, and the hearing, if
any, occurs in open court in the case of litigation but usually in a
private conference room in the case of arbitration.5 In cases that
proceed through a hearing and decision, the typically terse nature of
arbitral rulings means that much of the actual rationale for the
decision is hidden inside the arbitrator’s head—and even these terse
rulings are rarely published.6 The relative secrecy of arbitration is a
product partly of the confidentiality norms that prevail within this
private contractual forum and the community of arbitrators,7 and
partly of confidentiality agreements that often accompany pre-dispute
arbitration agreements and that bind the parties.8 The private and
contractual nature of arbitration makes it relatively easy for firms to

3. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2932–33 (2015)
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes] (quoting JUD. CONF. U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR
THE
FEDERAL COURTS 19–20 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf [http://perma.cc/WEY39U0q]); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771,
810 (2008). Among others elaborating similar views, see Howard M. Erichson, Foreword:
Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1123
(2009); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004); David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2629–32 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court:
The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004).
5. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M65J-JXNT] (describing differences between arbitration and court
proceedings).
6. See id.
7. For example, staff of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)—the
country’s largest providers of arbitration services—have an ethical obligation to keep
information confidential. AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/StatementofEthicalPrinciples [https://perma.cc/2E4A-EAZL].
8. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 466 (2006).
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prevent disclosure of just about anything concerning allegations,
evidence, disposition, or settlement of the disputes, not just by parties
but by the tribunals themselves.
To the extent that firms do impose obligations on their
employees (and customers) to arbitrate rather than litigate future
legal disputes, they can often draw a heavy veil of secrecy around
allegations of misconduct and their resolution. That means that firms
have less to worry about if they violate the law. They face more
limited “reputational sanctions,” which are among the most powerful
deterrents to illegal or legally questionable conduct, at least among
reputable firms.9 The relative invisibility of particular disputes and
their outcomes in arbitration thus undermines the regulatory function
of private-enforcement actions, which serve not only as a dispute
resolution mechanism but also as an ex post alternative or
supplement to ex ante prescriptive rules of conduct.10
The relative secrecy and obscurity of arbitral proceedings
extends to the nature of arbitral procedures themselves. Courts follow
published rules of procedure that are promulgated by publicly
accountable bodies. Arbitrators are primarily bound by the
agreements under which they are appointed—agreements that are
written by the parties, or rather by one party in the case of most
employment and consumer arbitration agreements.11 Some
arbitration instruments adopt the procedures of reputable arbitration
providers like the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”);12
others use more obscure providers or invent their own procedures.13
Either way, firms have no legal obligation to make their chosen
procedures publicly available.14 That has made it impossible to
develop an accurate empirical assessment of the shape of mandatory
arbitration as a mechanism of dispute resolution and has greatly
handicapped efforts to hold firms publicly accountable for the fairness
of their dispute resolution procedures.

9. See generally Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System
Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2016) (exploring the
impact of litigation on reputational sanctions).
10. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 385–86
(2007).
11. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–84 (2010).
12. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 5, at 17.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 18. On why that is problematic and why transparency should be
mandated (both for firms’ chosen arbitration procedures and for other terms and
conditions of employment), see generally Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for
Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011).
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In this Article, I focus on another dimension of the obscurity
surrounding mandatory arbitration: the outright disappearance of
claims that are subject to this process. The secrecy and nontransparency of arbitration providers and procedures greatly impeded
empirical research on arbitration, its incidence, and its outcomes for
decades after the Supreme Court launched the mandatory-arbitration
juggernaut. But the picture is gradually coming into focus. It now
appears that the great bulk of disputes that are subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements (“MAAs”)—that is, a large share of all legal
disputes between individuals (consumers and employees) and
corporations—simply evaporate before they are even filed. It is one
thing to know that mandatory arbitration draws a thick veil of secrecy
over cases that are subject to that process. It is quite another to find
that almost nothing lies behind that veil. Mandatory arbitration is less
of an “alternative dispute resolution” mechanism than it is a
magician’s disappearing trick or a mirage. Metaphors beckon, but I
have opted for that of the black hole into which matter collapses and
no light escapes.
The paucity of employment claims in arbitration has not gone
unnoticed by scholars. Alexander Colvin and his co-authors, who
have conducted much of the empirical work on arbitration of
employment disputes, have noted the strikingly small number of
arbitration filings.15 Jean Sternlight in particular has surveyed the
literature and data on this point and elaborated the implications for
employee rights.16 I highlight and elaborate on these findings here
because their implications are profound, and they deserve more
attention than they have gotten so far.
A word on the scope of this Article: first, the focus here is on
employment disputes. Although mandatory arbitration has probably
had a greater proportional impact on consumer claims (largely by way
of anti-class action provisions), employment claims are distinctive in
ways that matter here. Employment cases, with the exception of
wage-and-hour claims, are much more likely than consumer claims to
involve individual disputes with significant financial stakes for
15. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2011).
16. See Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309, 1328–29 (2015). Judith Resnick and Maria Glover have also highlighted the paucity
of arbitrations in both employment and consumer cases and the implications for access to
justice. See J. Maria Glover, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: Disappearing
Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3091–92 (2015); Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 3, at 2936.
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individual claimants (relative to their total resources). The prevalence
of fee-shifting provisions in many employment statutes17 attests to the
recognized importance of both the public interests at stake and of
private enforcement in vindicating those public interests.18 For
present purposes, it is also important that employment litigation has
long been and continues to be a major part of federal court dockets.19
Although the use of arbitration agreements has sharply increased in
recent years, many employees remain free to file their claims in
court.20 That makes it possible to compare some aspects of litigation
and arbitration that might otherwise remain obscure.21
Within the field of employment arbitration, this Article focuses
on employer-promulgated pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
non-union workplace; that is what is meant here by “mandatory
arbitration.” Arbitration under individually negotiated agreements
(mainly for high-salaried employees) or under either post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate or collective bargaining agreements is
different, and more likely to be a mutually beneficial alternative to
either litigation or labor-management strife. But arbitration that is
imposed on employees as a condition of employment before any
dispute has arisen, which is the focus of this Article, has been
deservedly controversial since its inception.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the
decades-long quest for empirical data on mandatory-employment
arbitration and highlights the small number of arbitrations that take
place under these provisions. Part II develops some rough estimates
of the number of “missing claims”—potential claims that are subject
to arbitration but never enter any adjudicatory process. Part III
explores some dimensions of the causal story behind why so few
claims are filed in arbitration. Part IV turns to the consequences of
the missing claims for enforcement of employee rights. Part V
concludes with a plea to reconsider the law of mandatory arbitration
17. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C § 216(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
18. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (per
curiam) (noting that Congress enacted a fee-shifting provision to help individuals advance
important policy goals by pursuing private remedies). These features are all found most
clearly in cases alleging discriminatory or retaliatory discharge, which make up a large
share of employment litigation. In wage-and-hour disputes, individual stakes are typically
smaller, and cases are often not viable without collective adjudication, as with most
consumer claims.
19. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
21. There are still many difficulties with comparing data on arbitration and litigation.
Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1325. Those difficulties are greatest in relation to data on
outcomes. This Article focuses more narrowly on initial filings.
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in light of mounting evidence that it effectively enables employers to
nullify employee rights and to insulate themselves from the liabilities
that back up crucial public policies.
I. THE LONG QUEST FOR DATA ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Federal courts keep public records of lawsuits and filings, and
some basic information about types of cases. Based on that data and
other information about the disposition of cases, scholars have long
been producing empirical studies of litigation.22 (Data from state
courts is far more difficult to gather or assess.)23 The information is
limited, but the federal courts are exemplars of transparency
compared to the world of arbitration. While federal law routinely
consigns federal statutory claims to private arbitration pursuant to
mandatory pre-dispute “agreements” imposed as a condition of
employment, it does not require either employers or arbitration
providers to publish any information about the agreements, the
procedures, or the cases thus resolved.24 Moreover, nothing in the
burgeoning law of arbitration under the FAA, despite its impact on
the enforcement of important public policies, regulates what entities
may provide arbitration. Apart from concerns about the fairness of
these decision-making processes, the lack of regulation and
transparency has made it very difficult for scholars to assemble data
about the aggregate dimensions or consequences of arbitration in
employment (or consumer) cases.25
The largest arbitration providers are well-established, reputable
organizations like the American Arbitration Association and the
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (“JAMS”).26 Survey data

22. For examples in the employment discrimination field, see generally Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 983 (1991).
23. Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1324–25.
24. See Estlund, supra note 14, at 355. Some state laws (including in California)
require arbitration providers to publicize certain information about the consumer and
employment cases they handle; although compliance with these laws varies, the resulting
data has greatly improved the empirical study of arbitration. Id.
25. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System Designs that
Use Arbitration: Transparency, The Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32,
42–43 (2014); Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1323–24.
26. See ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES 34 (2014),
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indicate that the AAA is designated in about half of employment
arbitration agreements, and JAMS in another twenty percent.27 Both
organizations provide lists of qualified arbitrators and are relatively
transparent in how arbitrators are chosen, who they are, and how they
deal with disputes (though both organizations also promote
confidentiality in the proceedings themselves).28 Both the AAA and
JAMS also adhere to the much-touted “Due Process Protocol”
(“DPP”), a set of standards for fair employment arbitration
procedures that was approved by a diverse group representing
employers, unions, employees, and dispute resolution professionals.29
But nothing in the law of arbitration requires arbitration providers to
adhere to the DPP, and nothing requires employers to designate the
AAA or JAMS as the arbitration provider.
An estimated thirty percent of arbitration provisions call for
adjudication of disputes through other providers or ad hoc
processes.30 In this grey zone, arbitration procedures, the pool of
arbitrators, the selection process, and case outcomes may all be
impossible for outside observers to ascertain. It appears that some of
those providers succumb to the temptation to supply what some firms
demand, and cater quite openly to the employers who unilaterally
draft and impose arbitration agreements and who choose the
providers. For example, consider the egregiously one-sided
agreement struck down by the Fourth Circuit in Hooters of America,
Inc. v. Phillips,31 which, among its many defects, essentially
guaranteed that the employer would choose the arbitrator.32 But it
can hardly be surprising that the overwhelmingly asymmetric process

http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1059&context=reports
[https://perma.cc/A853-9SK4].
27. Id. at 34–35.
28. JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERV., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE
ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 16–18, 28 (2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/files
/uploads/documents/jams-rules/jams_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8ELD-9VV5]; AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 7.
29. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
165, 174 (2005); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL 1–5 (1995), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository
/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6M4-5CW8].
30. See COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 35 fig. 23.
31. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 938–39 (“[T]he employee’s arbitrator and the third arbitrator must
be selected from a list of arbitrators created exclusively by Hooters. This gives Hooters
control over the entire panel and places no limits whatsoever on whom Hooters can put on
the list.”).
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of “choosing” arbitration and arbitration providers would put
pressure on the neutrality of the process.
A 2015 front page New York Times series pierced the veil of
secrecy to expose the partiality of arbitration in practice—even
among some AAA and JAMS arbitrators.33 Among the “subtler”
forms of partiality was “the case of the arbitrator who went to a
basketball game with the company’s lawyers the night before the
proceedings began. (The company won.)”34 In another case, “a
dismayed [plaintiff] watched the arbitrator and defense lawyer return
in matching silver sports cars after going to lunch together. (He
lost.)”35 Part of the problem is the so-called “repeat player effect,” or
the tendency of arbitrators to favor the party that is more likely to
produce repeat business.36 The Times reporters found that, out of the
cases they examined, “41 arbitrators each handled 10 or more cases
for one company between 2010 and 2014.”37 One “JAMS arbitrator in
an employment case . . . simultaneously had 28 other cases involving
the [defendant] company.”38 As for the impact of this fact, in
interviews, “more than three dozen arbitrators described how they
felt beholden to companies. Beneath every decision, the arbitrators
said, was the threat of losing business.”39 As for the employeecomplainants, one arbitrator said, “Why would an arbitrator cater to
a person they will never see again?”40 The veil of secrecy that shields
arbitration from public scrutiny and from all but the most persistent
investigators has obscured these problems for decades.
The opacity of the arbitration process translates into a paucity of
empirical data on how mandatory arbitration works and how it has
affected the enforcement of public laws. From 1992, when Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.41 launched the mandatory arbitration

33. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization
of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02
/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc
/9UY4-3K3K (dark archive)]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/Z5WM-H8C2 (dark archive)].
34. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 190–91 (1999).
37. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
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juggernaut within the field of statutory employment claims, until
about 2010, there was little representative data on any aspect of
arbitration under those employer-devised procedures.42 The early
data that did exist came disproportionately from individually
negotiated arbitration agreements (typically involving high-level
executives).43
Based on the partial early data, some commentators reached a
conclusion that was quite consistent with the Gilmer Court’s sanguine
account of the quid pro quo of mandatory arbitration: By agreeing to
arbitrate, parties trade “the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.”44 Plaintiffs, for their part, lost access to juries, judges,
and appellate review, but gained access to a faster and often cheaper
adjudication process.45 Based on that early data, Professor Samuel
Estreicher and others concluded that arbitration had some
advantages for both sides over the expensive and “lottery-like”
litigation process; recoveries were more limited, but employees—
especially low-income employees—were more likely to get some kind
of hearing and more likely to get some kind of remedy.46 On that
then-plausible account, the advent of mandatory arbitration appeared
likely to enhance ordinary employees’ access to justice.
The picture has become a bit clearer in recent years, due in part
to a handful of state laws, including California’s, requiring arbitration
providers to publicly disclose a modicum of information about the
disputes they handle.47 In addition the AAA has allowed some
scholars to examine case files, under assurances of confidentiality, and
to publish some aggregate data.48 The comparatively rich body of
empirical research that has emerged in recent years is still far from
42. See Colvin, supra note 15, at 11 tbl.2.
43. See id. at 5.
44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, 472 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
45. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL., 559,
563–64 (2001).
46. See id.; Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 (1998); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath
Water and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 148
(1999); Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past
Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 417–18 (2010).
47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through ch. 2 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.).
48. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 79–82 (2014).
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comprehensive. It is also likely to overstate the fairness of arbitration
for claimant-employees because the data comes from arbitration
providers who comply with state-disclosure requirements (many do
not),49 and especially from the AAA, which has supported scholarly
efforts to understand the operation and impact of arbitration.50
With that in mind, it is striking how discouraging the more recent
data are. It now appears not only that average recoveries are
significantly lower in arbitration than in court (as previously
believed), but also that employee-complainants may be significantly
less likely to prevail and to recover anything.51 Colvin and Gough, for
example, found that employees won something in 19.1% of AAA
arbitrations that were terminated from 2003 to 2013.52 That compares
to the findings of other scholars that plaintiffs won something in
29.7% of federal employment discrimination cases,53 57% of state
non-civil rights employment cases, and 59% of California state
wrongful discharge cases.54 Moreover, employees who did win
something recovered much less in AAA arbitration than in litigation:
The median award was $36,500 in arbitration versus $176,426 in
federal discrimination cases, $85,560 in state non-civil rights
employment cases, and $355,843 in California wrongful discharge
cases.55 Still, data on case outcomes are hotly contested, and their

49. See David J. Jung et al., PUB. LAW RES. INST., REPORTING CONSUMER
ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA 3 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitrationreport/2014-arbitration-update [https://perma.cc/UZ46-FX6K].
50. Colvin and Gough, for example, were able to examine AAA files, under promises
of confidentiality, to examine case outcomes and characteristics. Alexander J.D. Colvin &
Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors
and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1019, 1019 (2015).
51. Data on outcomes are difficult to gather and to interpret, particularly in light of
high rates of settlement, about which information is especially scarce. So there is still
considerable debate about these matters. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Michael Heise &
David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical
Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 16) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (comparing and critiquing various studies on outcomes in
arbitration and litigation).
52. Colvin & Gough, supra note 50, at 1028 tbl.1. Looking at more recent data,
Professor Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn found an employee win rate of 22.4% in cases
resulting in an award. Estreicher et al. supra note 51 (manuscript at 10).
53. See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 28 (2015).
54. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 535 (2003).
55. Colvin, supra note 48, at 80.
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meaning is clouded by high rates of dismissal and summary judgment
in court and by the paucity of data on settlements.56
My focus here, however, is not on outcomes in arbitration versus
litigation, but on the sheer number of cases in each. The single most
striking fact uncovered by the recent studies is the very small number
of arbitration cases that enter the process. During the eleven-year
period from 2003 through 2013, an average of about 940 cases per
year were filed and terminated with the AAA under employerpromulgated procedures.57 If the AAA is the designated provider in
about half of arbitration agreements (as surveys suggest),58 that yields
an estimate of fewer than 2000 employment arbitration cases
terminated per year under MAAs.59 At first glance, that appears to be
a very low number. Let us dig in a bit to see how low it is (in Part II)
and to begin to understand why it might be so low (in Part III).60
II. COUNTING “MISSING” ARBITRATION CASES
To assess the meaning of the small number of arbitrations, we
might start by comparing that number with the number of employees
covered by MAAs. Until recently, the prevailing scholarly estimate
was that those agreements covered roughly twenty percent of nonunion private sector employees.61 (That compared to just over two
percent coverage in 1992.62) By contrast, Colvin’s more
comprehensive 2017 study estimated that 56 percent of non-union
private sector employees, or approximately 60 million employees, are
now covered by MAAs.63 That is a steep increase in coverage, and it
sharply raises the stakes in debates over mandatory arbitration. But
of course those numbers beg the question: How many such
56. See Estreicher et al., supra note 51 (manuscript at 10–11).
57. Colvin & Gough, supra note 50, at 1027.
58. See COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 34–35.
59. In theory, there could be a larger, though hidden trove of arbitrations conducted
by non-AAA providers. But the opposite is more probable: Claimants are probably much
less likely to file claims with non-AAA providers, many of which are less reputable and
less committed to treating claimants fairly. See infra text accompanying note 78–79.
60. Again, let me note that Jean Sternlight has reported on these matters in greater
detail than I do here. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1332.
61. This estimate was based on Colvin’s 2007 studies of the telecommunications
industry, in which he found that fifteen to twenty-five percent of employees were covered
by arbitration agreements. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 410–
11 (2007).
62. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 4 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VCG8-37UU].
63. Id. at 2.
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individuals each year have potential employment law claims—claims
that proceed past “naming” and “blaming” to “claiming” in some
forum or another?64
I will focus here solely on the number of claims filed (whether or
not they are terminated), as that will allow for a relatively clean
comparison with federal court filing statistics, and will avoid many
controversies surrounding the analysis of case outcomes. I will focus
on filings in 2016, the most recent year for which solid data are
available for both the AAA and federal courts.65 The AAA reports
that 2879 individuals filed employment cases with the AAA under
employer-promulgated procedures in 2016.66 Following the
provisional assumption above that this represents half of all
arbitrations under MAAs,67 that suggests that about 5126 cases were
filed in arbitration by the approximately 60 million employees who
are covered by MAAs. That appears to represent an increase above
what Colvin found, on average, from 2003 to 2013, and that is what
one would expect given his recent findings on growing use of
MAAs.68 Still, it seems like a very low number. But to make sense of
it, one needs to know how many claims were filed in court by those
free to do so. That might make it possible to roughly estimate the
number of claims one would expect to see among those covered by
MAAs.69
64. The iconic terminology is from William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin
Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980).
65. I use a single year’s data in part because of Colvin’s 2017 study showing that
coverage of MAAs has risen steeply in recent years. COLVIN, supra note 62, at 1. In earlier
years, fewer workers were presumably covered by MAAs, but there is no data on
coverage. Insofar as the coverage percentage is a key element of the analysis below, I use
only the most recent year for which data on court and arbitration are available.
66. Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics and In-House Research, to
author (Oct. 24, 2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Between 2012 and
2016, an average of 2563 cases per year were filed under employer promulgated
procedures. Id. The AAA reports one filing per individual, even if multiple individuals are
covered by the same complaint. See Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/ConsumerArbitrationStatistics [https://perma.cc/N2MJ-YRW4].
67. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. I will question that assumption
below.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 57–64. Note, too, that my 2016 data are on
filings, while Colvin’s numbers above from 2003–2013 are for cases filed and terminated.
69. One caveat to this comparison stems from the fact that some unknown number of
individuals (mostly high-income professional or managerial employees) are covered not by
employer-promulgated procedures (what I call MAAs here) but rather by individuallynegotiated arbitration agreements. Those individuals are not included in Colvin’s estimate
of 56% coverage by MAAs, and arbitrations under those agreements are not included in
the AAA numbers reported here. See Alexander Colvin & Kell Pike, Saturns and
Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Employment Arbitration System has Developed?, 29
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Let us begin with federal court litigation, as to which data are
readily available. In 2016, approximately 31,000 federal lawsuits were
filed in five categories of employment cases: “Civil rights:
employment,”
“ADA
[Americans
with
Disabilities
Act]/employment,” “FLSA” (Fair Labor Standards Act), “ERISA”
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act), and “FMLA” (Family
and Medical Leave Act).70 If those 31,000 federal court cases were all
filed by the 44 percent of employees who are not covered by MAAs,
then we would expect over 39,000 claims to be filed in arbitration by
the other 56 percent of employees who are subject to mandatory
arbitration.71 Given the preliminary estimate of 5,126 arbitration
filings,72 this comparison would suggest about 34,000 “missing”
arbitrations per year—that is, 34,000 cases that we would expect to
enter the arbitration process, based on the general rate of
employment litigation and the number of employees covered by
MAAs, but that are never filed.
That is a striking number of “missing” arbitrations. But these
numbers are open to several objections, two of which may call for
downward adjustments, and are reflected in Figure 1. First, some
federal court lawsuits are filed by public employees, who are not
generally subject to MAAs and should be excluded from the
comparison. If government employees (who make up 15.2% of nonfarm employees) are as likely as private sector employees to file an
employment lawsuit in federal court, the relevant number of federal
court filings would fall to 26,300.73 Second, some of the federal court
lawsuits were presumably filed by individuals who were covered by

OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 63–66 (2014). In terms of actual arbitrations, the numbers
are small; in 2008, for example, 27.6% of the AAA’s employment arbitration docket (124
out of 449 cases) arose out of individually-negotiated agreements. Id. Ignoring those cases
might introduce some small distortion into the comparison between rates of litigation and
of arbitration. I have tried to take this problem into account below. See infra note 79.
70. U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, During the 12Month Periods Ending September 30, 2012 Through 2016, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c2a_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8428-MMJ5].
71. That is: (56 ÷ 44) x 31,000. It is more likely that the federal court numbers includes
some claims that are covered by MAAs. That is taken into account below, see infra note
74.
72. See supra text accompanying note 67.
73. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 15.2% of non-farm employees work
for the government at some level. Current Labor Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Sept. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm [https://perma.cc
/6SA9-H23W].
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MAAs (and thus faced a motion to compel arbitration).74 In the
absence of any data on this point, Figure 1 shows a range of expected
arbitration claims, with the top number reflecting the assumption that
no claims covered by MAAs were initially filed in federal court, and
the bottom number reflecting the assumption that all such claims
were initially filed in federal court.75 These two adjustments lead to an
estimate of “expected” arbitrations between 14,70076 and 33,500,77 as
compared to the 5,126 arbitrations that appear to have been filed, and
to an estimate of between 9600 and 28,400 “missing” arbitrations.
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

Between 9600 and
28,400 “missing”
arbitration claims

Federal court

Expected arbitration

Actual - arbitration

Figure 1: An Initial Estimate of “Missing” Employment Claims
in Arbitration (2016)
In several respects, however, the Figure 1 estimate of “missing
arbitrations” is far too conservative. To begin with, the estimate of
arbitrations filed is almost certainly too high. It assumes that
employee-plaintiffs are equally likely to file a claim whether they are
covered by AAA- or non-AAA-administered arbitrations. Given that
many of the latter do not abide by the DPP, and that some are
74. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are not always aware of the existence of an MAA
until after filing a lawsuit. See Mark D. Gough, Employment Lawyers and Mandatory
Arbitration: Facilitating or Forestalling Access to Justice?, in 22 MANAGING & RESOLVING
WORKPLACE CONFLICT 105, 124 (David B. Lipsky, Ariel C. Avgar, & J. Ryan Lamare
eds., 2016).
75. In the latter (extremely unlikely) event, the federal claims (26,300) would
represent 100% of all claims, and 56% of those claims (about 14,700) would be relegated
to arbitration.
76. See supra note 75.
77. That is: (56 ÷ 44) x 26,300. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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employer-controlled,78 it seems probable (and my conversations with
plaintiffs’ attorneys and other experts suggest) that employeeplaintiffs are much less likely to file a claim if they are subject to a
non-AAA-administered arbitration. If that is so, then a more realistic
estimate of arbitration cases filed in 2016 might be 4000 or less.
Nonetheless, I have left the higher estimate of 5126 in place in Figure
2 below.79
At the same time, the number of court filings in Figure 1 is
certainly too low. First, it takes no account of employment litigation
in state court; that would include employee claims resting on state
common law or statutory grounds, and those that plaintiffs choose to
file in state court because the forum is viewed as friendlier. In the
most populous state of California, for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys
rarely choose to file employment actions in federal court.80 Second,
some of the federal lawsuits (as well as some of the excluded state
lawsuits) are class or collective actions, some of which might cover
hundreds of employees or more. By contrast, employees covered by
MAAs are usually precluded from pursuing their claims as a group.81
On the first point, the volume of employment litigation in state
courts is notoriously difficult to pin down.82 However, Professor Mark
Gough, drawing on two large studies of state court litigation, has
developed a rough estimate of 195,000 employment lawsuits per year
in state courts of general jurisdiction.83 That estimate is based on
78. Cf. COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 34.
79. I do so partly because of the lack of data on non-AAA arbitrations, and partly in
order to offset any potential distortion that might be attributed to the exclusion of
arbitrations under individually-negotiated arbitration agreements. See supra note 69.
80. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1332 n. 143 (citing GARY BLASI & JOSEPH W.
DOHERTY, UCLA LAW-RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT
AND HOUSING ACT AT 50, at 11 (2010)).
81. Colvin’s 2017 survey showed that thirty percent of MAAs contained such a clause.
COLVIN, supra note 62, at 3. Because larger employers were more likely to have such a
clause in their MAAs, that suggests that forty-one percent of employees covered by
MAAs, and twenty-three percent of all employees, were expressly barred from filing or
participating in a class or collective action. Id. For agreements that are silent about class
claims, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. holds that silence regarding class arbitration implies lack of party
consent, and thus precludes class arbitration. 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010).
82. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1325 nn.99–100.
83. See email from Mark D. Gough, Assistant Professor, Penn State Coll. of Liberal
Arts, to author (Nov. 30, 2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Gough used
the most recent (2013) data from the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) showing
that over 5.9 million civil cases were filed in state courts of general jurisdiction. See NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media
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some untested (though plausible) assumptions, as Gough recognizes.84
But it is more likely to understate than to overstate the volume of
state employment litigation given that it still excludes cases from five
jurisdictions, including California, which together account for
eighteen percent of the national population.85 All in all, including
Gough’s estimate of 195,000 state cases is likely to yield a more
realistic estimate of total employment lawsuits, and a more realistic
estimate of “missing” arbitration cases.86
The second point relates to a legal controversy over the status of
aggregate employment claims in arbitration that is currently before
the Supreme Court.87 The National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) held in D.R. Horton, Inc.,88 that employers violate the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in seeking employees’
waiver of the right to bring collective legal claims of any kind: Section
7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to engage in “concerted

/microsites/files/csp/ewsc_csp_2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/G2QL-VG8R]. Gough then
used the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts (“CJSSC”) finding that 3.3% of civil verdicts
in 2005 were in employment disputes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND
JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 STATISTICS 2 tbl.1 (2008) https://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFA4-QZRL].
84. The resulting estimate of 194,700 employment cases is based on two assumptions:
that employment cases represented the same percentage of filings as of verdicts; and that
this percentage has held steady since 2005. In Gough’s view (and mine), both assumptions
are reasonable though unproven. Any overestimate of employment cases is likely to be
offset by the uncounted cases from California and five other jurisdictions, which are still
excluded. See infra note 85.
85. The excluded jurisdictions are California, Illinois, Idaho, Minnesota, and the
District of Columbia (plus Puerto Rico). They are excluded from the NCSC data that
Gough relied on because they have “single-tiered” court systems, which take in enormous
numbers of cases (such as traffic violations) that go to courts of limited jurisdiction in the
included jurisdictions. I calculated the populations using 2016 Census data. See Annual
Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, 2016 Population
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces
/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/6Z3N-JNE4].
86. It should be noted that some cases might be filed in state court but then removed
to federal court; they might thus be counted twice in state and federal court statistics. That
is especially likely for class actions given the removal provisions of the Class Action
Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012). But given the severe
undercount of class actions overall, and the omission of cases from California in state
statistics, see infra note 85, I do not believe the potential double-counting problem is
significant.
87. The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three decisions: Lewis v. Epic Sys.
Corp, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017); and NLRB v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017).
88. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012), enforcement denied in part, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir.
2013).
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activities for . . . mutual aid or protection,”89 and that has long been
held to include employees’ collective pursuit of legal claims through
courts or otherwise.90 According to the NLRB, the fact that such a
waiver is part of an arbitration agreement does not make it
enforceable under the FAA.91 Given a split among the courts of
appeals,92 the Supreme Court has agreed to decide the matter.
The problem for employees is that some legal claims cannot
practicably be adjudicated on an individual basis. In particular, many
FLSA wage and hour claims involve incremental pay disparities over
a few years; the cost of litigating them as an individual often exceeds
the expected returns.93 But if many individuals are subject to the same
challenged practice, as is often true, employees can practicably pursue
their claims through a class or collective action.94 If employers have
their way in the Supreme Court, they will be free to block all such
actions, and to virtually nullify a large category of employee claims
that are not viable on an individual basis, simply by requiring
individual arbitration. This is a point to which I will return in Part V.
For present purposes, however, the point is simpler and less
controversial: Given the existence of class and collective claims in
court (but not in arbitration), any count of court cases, including the
number of federal cases in Figure 1, greatly understates the number
of individuals whose claims are encompassed by those filings.
Some useful data exist in one category of cases: lawsuits under
the FLSA filed in federal court (8686 cases in 2016). A recent law
firm report asserts that nearly all FLSA lawsuits in the past several
89. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
90. D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278.
91. Id. at 2287.
92. Compare Epic Sys., 823 F.3d at 1147 (upholding the NLRB view) and Ernst &
Young, 834 F.3d 975 at 975, 990 (same) and NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 858
F.3d 393, 408, No. 16-1385 (6th Cir. 2017) (same), with Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v.
NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the NLRB view) and Murphy Oil, 808
F.3d at 1015 (rejecting NLRB view) and Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290,
299 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).
93. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379,
427–29 (2006).
94. A “collective action” under the FLSA allows many similarly situated individuals
to join in a single lawsuit, and thus to litigate more efficiently than through multiple
individual lawsuits; yet this form of group litigation lacks many of the advantages of class
actions, and particularly of “opt-out” actions under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See generally Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage
Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 U. MINN. L.
REV. 1317 (2008) (chronicling the difficulties of collective FLSA actions as compared to
class actions).
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years were filed as class or collective actions.95 Let us assume, more
conservatively, that 7000 of those 8686 FLSA actions were aggregate
actions,96 and that each of those covered, on average, fifty
individuals.97 That would yield an additional 350,000 claims in federal
court—that is, 350,000 individuals who would stand some chance of
recovering something as a result of group litigation. Figure 2 reflects
that adjustment, as well as Gough’s partial estimate of 195,000
additional employment claims filed in state court. Those additions to
the Figure 1 estimate of 26,300 federal lawsuits bring the estimated
total number of employment claims encompassed by court filings to
571,300.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the resulting estimate of total
employment claims filed in court leads to a striking estimate of
“expected” claims in arbitration: If MAA-covered employees were as
willing and able to arbitrate their claims as non-MAA-covered
employees are willing and able to litigate, then we would expect to
see between 320,000 and 727,000 employment claims in arbitration
(depending again on how many of the claims encompassed by court
filings were covered by MAAs).98 Given the estimated 5126 claims
actually filed in arbitration, that suggests an estimated 315,000 to
722,000 “missing” arbitration cases. Stated differently, well under two
percent of the employment claims that one would expect to find in
some forum, but that are covered by MAAs, ever enter the
arbitration process.

95. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 13TH ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION REPORT 20 (2017), https://www.workplaceclassaction.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/214/2017/01/CAR-2017-Chapter-1-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/92KB-HXYX].
96. For the total number of FLSA actions (8686), see U.S. COURTS, supra note 70, at
tbl.C-2A. The estimate of 7000 FLSA aggregate actions is conservative relative to the
Seyfarth Shaw report contending that “[v]irtually all” FLSA claims are filed as class or
collective actions. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 95, at 20.
97. Fifty claims per aggregate action is meant to be a conservative estimate; compare
to Professor Sternlight’s estimate of 500 individuals per group claim. Sternlight, supra note
16 at 1337. If fifty seems high, consider that other class and collective actions, such as those
under employment discrimination laws and all of those filed in state court, are not taken
into account at all.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77 (explaining the rationale behind the top
and bottom of this range).
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Figure 2: An Estimate of “Missing” Employment Claims in
Arbitration (including those encompassed by aggregate FLSA
claims) (2016)
By graphically representing these estimates, I do not intend to
imply greater precision than the evidence permits. I do intend to
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highlight the jaw-dropping disparities in estimated filing rates
between court and arbitration, which are large enough, I would argue,
to swamp any quibbles about precise numbers. And that is despite the
omission of state court litigation in California and several other
jurisdictions, as well as many claims encompassed by class or
collective actions. Given those omissions, Figure 2 probably
understates the number of claims encompassed by court filings, and
thus the number of claims one would hypothetically expect to be filed
in arbitration if it were a comparably accessible and hospitable forum.
All in all, the available evidence suggests that the overwhelming
majority of claims that would have been litigated but for the presence
of a MAA are simply dropped without being filed in any forum at all.
Before turning to the reasons for the paucity of arbitration cases,
let us take note of two possible but unquantifiable explanations for at
least part of the disparity shown above. First, it is possible that
employers that impose MAAs are systematically different from those
that do not, and less likely to generate claims. We do know that larger
and more sophisticated employers are more likely to use MAAs.99 If
those larger employers are less likely to violate the law and to
generate employee claims, then one would expect fewer claims from
employees covered by MAAs than the “expected” numbers
generated above. On the other hand, it would not be surprising if the
obscure netherworld of employer-dominated arbitration attracted
some less scrupulous employers seeking to immunize themselves from
liabilities. Nor would it be surprising if employers who jumped on the
mandatory arbitration bandwagon in the wake of AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion100 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,101 and who might have been motivated chiefly by the
prospect of foreclosing all group claims, are a less scrupulous bunch
than the early adopters, and perhaps less scrupulous than the average
employer. Either of those surmises might lead one to expect more
disputes arising among employees covered by MAAs than the
“expected” numbers above. I know of no data pointing either way,
but these possibilities cloud the meaning of the “missing” arbitration
cases, and qualify what follows.
It is also important to recognize that employee claims can be
resolved before they are filed in any forum, and that this might be
more likely for claims that are subject to mandatory arbitration than

99. See COLVIN, supra note 62, at 5.
100. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
101. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
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for those that are not.102 Some employers use mandatory arbitration
as the final stage in a structured alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) process.103 Those processes typically call for formal or
informal mediation, as well as confidential meetings with
ombudsmen, before any arbitration.104 At least in the first decade or
so after Gilmer, employers that used mandatory arbitration were
considerably more likely to have robust internal-grievance
procedures.105 To the extent that remains true, it suggests that the
resolution of arbitrable claims before they are formally filed—
through mediation, for example—might account for some of the
“missing claims” estimated above. On the other hand, it is possible
that later adopters of MAAs, and especially those drawn in by the
ability to block group claims, were less likely than the early adopters
to embed arbitration within a structured dispute resolution process.
All in all, it seems unlikely that this difference—a higher rate of early
dispute resolution among arbitrable claims—accounts for more than a
fraction of the estimated “missing” arbitration cases. But it is surely
one more source of uncertainty about the numbers.
Much is still unknown about the fate of cases in arbitration (and
litigation). From whatever angle one looks at the numbers, however,
it appears that a very large majority of aggrieved individuals who face
the prospect of mandatory arbitration give up their claims before
filing. For all the sound and fury about skewed outcomes, repeat
player effects, biased arbitrators, limited discovery, and lack of
adherence to or production of precedent in arbitration,106 it turns out

102. I thank Professor David Sherwyn for highlighting this point.
103. See David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1581–91 (2005).
104. Id. at 1586.
105. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643, 649
(2001) (finding telecommunications industry employers that elected to use arbitration
were more likely to also have structured ADR processes). Moreover, employees were
more likely to bring grievances in workplaces that had such systems. Alexander J.S.
Colvin, The Dual Transformation of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 INDUS. REL. 712,
729 (2003) (finding peer-review and nonunion arbitration procedures had grievance rates
that were, respectively, forty-three percent and sixty-eight percent higher than basic
nonunion procedures). It is worth noting, however, that not all claims resolved via such
grievance procedures are legally cognizable. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From CourtSurrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration,
41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 843, 849 n.14 (2008).
106. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 36, at 190–91 (discussing repeat player effects);
David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 246
(2012) (“If the arbitrator decides that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable, he loses
income.”); Stone, supra note 1, at 1040 (discussing pro-employer outcomes in arbitration).
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that, except for a relative handful of cases, arbitration does not take
place at all.107 That is the black hole of mandatory arbitration.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING CASES: WHY SO FEW
ARBITRATIONS?
What happens to the claims that can be adjudicated only in
arbitration but are never filed? Conjecture calls for caution. But let us
bring some hypothetical plaintiffs’ attorneys into the story.108 And let
us assume that those attorneys are rational actors with at least a
rough idea of the law and empirics surrounding arbitration. After all,
attorneys’ livelihood depends on their ability to calculate the
probabilities and degrees of success, or risk-return ratios, in cases
brought to them.109 Suppose now that they learn that a prospective
client is subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement. What enters
into their calculations in deciding whether to take a case?
With or without an express anti-aggregation clause, they know
that an MAA is likely to knock out some small value claims at the
outset even if they are shared by hundreds or thousands of the
complainant’s co-workers.110 The legality of those clauses is currently
before the Supreme Court, as noted above,111 so let us focus on other
legally questionable provisions the attorney might encounter, and that
might impede the fair adjudication of otherwise viable individual
claims.
Attorneys at the intake point may or may not have access to a
detailed written description of the arbitration process. If they do, they
might find some provisions that would bar the claim altogether (like a
very short limitations period or unaffordable arbitrator fees), or
impede investigation (like very limited discovery), or sharply skew
proceedings against the complainant (like a biased arbitrator pool or
a skewed selection process), or curtail recovery even in the event of
107. Of course, that may be precisely because of the many discrete problems that have
attracted critical attention; more on this below.
108. Although claimants can proceed in arbitration without legal representation—that
was once thought to be an advantage of arbitration—it does not appear to be a very
successful strategy. Colvin found that, for the 24.9% of employees who represented
themselves, the win rate was 18.3% and the average award overall was $12,228, as
compared to 22.9% win rate and $28,993 average award for represented claimants. Colvin,
supra note 15, at 16. I note that the perspective of plaintiffs’ attorneys, as with much else in
this Article, has been explored quite thoroughly by Professor Gough based on his survey
of 1,256 employment plaintiff attorneys, Gough, supra note 74, and by Professor Sternlight
in her article, Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1334–40.
109. For evidence that they do just that, see Gough, supra note 74, at 120–21.
110. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 427–30.
111. See supra note 87.
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“success” (like provisions against attorney fee shifting or punitive
damages, or damage limits). It hardly helps, of course, if the
arbitration agreement is vague or silent about these matters. If
attorneys do identify invalid or troublingly vague provisions, they
know that a court challenge would be costly, and would almost
certainly pour them back into the still-flawed arbitration process,
whether or not the court recognizes the flaws in that process.112
Let us underscore this point: Some “missing” or dropped cases
are probably dropped because they would be subject to invalid
arbitration provisions that nonetheless deter claims. The viable legal
objections to arbitration are dwindling, especially under the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors, which sharply
limited courts’ ability to police the fairness of arbitration agreements
under either the state contract doctrine of unconscionability or the
federal common law concept of “effective vindication” of statutory
rights.113 But the doctrine appears to still make it possible to challenge
arbitration provisions that, for example, preclude statutorily
prescribed remedies (including attorney fees),114 skew the selection of
arbitrators,115 or impose excessive arbitrator fees or other barriers to
the arbitral forum.116 Unfortunately, even these standards of fairness
are administered in a manner that undermines their efficacy. Most
objections are relegated to the arbitral forum itself for case-by-case
resolution (as in the case of excessive arbitrator fees);117 unfair
provisions are likely to be struck or amended from an agreement
rather than invalidating the agreement. As a result, firms get the
benefit of the arbitration agreement despite any overreaching.118 That
inevitably tempts unscrupulous firms to “go for it”—to include
knowingly unfair or invalid provisions that are likely to discourage
many complainants and their attorneys from pursuing a case at all,
with little or no downside risk in case the overreach is detected and

112. Most alleged defects in the arbitral process must be adjudicated within that very
process. See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 265.
113. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013).
114. That appears to come within the narrowed Italian Colors exception to blanket
enforceability of arbitration agreements: the exception “would certainly cover a provision
. . . forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights.” Id. at 236.
115. Or so one can hope. Some “arbitration agreements,” like the one invalidated in
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999), arguably do not even
qualify as “arbitration,” the essence of which is an impartial decision maker chosen by
both sides.
116. “Perhaps” such a provision would be invalid, per Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236.
117. See Green Tree Fin. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–92 (2000).
118. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 405.
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corrected.119 Legally objectionable arbitration clauses and procedures,
as well as vague and indeterminate ones, can deter both litigation and
arbitration, especially by plaintiffs in relatively small-dollar cases.
Even if plaintiffs’ attorneys do not encounter (or can surmount
or ignore) all these hurdles to a fair arbitration process, they
presumably know that they are less likely to win anything, and thus
recover any attorneys’ fees, and even less likely to win enough to
make the odyssey worthwhile for the attorney or the client. In short,
expected recoveries (including attorneys’ fees) in arbitration will
often fall below some threshold of economic viability for attorneys.
Even in cases with “smoking gun” evidence and scandalous facts that
might have jolted a jury into a mega-bucks verdict or posed a risk of
serious public opprobrium for the defendant firm, arbitration muffles
or even eliminates those risks.
With all of this in mind, does a rational attorney take the case? Is
it even worth writing a demand letter seeking to settle such a claim?
Would a demand letter have any credible threat behind it? From all
that appears from the data, the answer to all those questions is
“rarely.”
Of course, litigation is no panacea for plaintiffs.120 Many
potential employee-claimants who believe they have been wronged
are still free to litigate their claims (if they have not already waived
those claims on their way out of the job though a severance
agreement).121 Yet most of them cannot get an attorney to represent
them. Given plaintiffs’ bleak track record in court, experienced
attorneys agree to represent only a tiny fraction of the prospective
clients they see—only about ten percent, according to surveys of
plaintiffs’ attorneys.122 For most claims, the risk-return ratio is
apparently too low even in court. To be sure, many individuals who
believe they have been wronged, and who seek legal advice, have very
weak legal claims on either the facts or the law.123 Still, it looks as
119. Id.
120. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL. REV.
103 (2009) (detailing how plaintiffs in employment cases struggle in litigation).
121. See Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 943, 948 (1998).
122. COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 26, at 14–15.
123. That proposition is obviously difficult to document. But it is often repeated by
judges and by lawyers for both plaintiffs and employers, even with regard to claims that
are actually filed. For example, two management-side lawyers quote several federal judges
who characterize some employment litigation as frivolous or not well-founded. See Jay W.
Waks & Gregory R. Fidlon, Federal Judges Recognize Growing Trend of Dubious
Workplace Discrimination Cases, N.Y. EMP. L. & PRAC., Mar. 2000, at 1–2,
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though the presence of a mandatory arbitration provision
dramatically reduces an employee’s chance of securing legal
representation,124 as well as her chance of any kind of recovery, any
kind of hearing, or any formal complaint being filed on her behalf.
IV. FROM CAUSES TO CONSEQUENCES: EMPLOYER EXCULPATION
AND JUDICIAL ABDICATION
If the imposition of mandatory arbitration means that the
employer faces only a miniscule chance of ever confronting a formal
legal claim in any forum regarding future legal misconduct against its
employees, then such a provision virtually amounts to an ex ante
exculpatory clause, and an ex ante waiver of substantive rights that
the law declares non-waivable.125 Let me explain.
Nearly all statutory rights and most common law rights of
employees are non-waivable or inalienable: An employee who is
covered by the minimum wage law cannot make a valid agreement to
waive its protections and to accept a lower wage; nor can she agree to
waive the protections of antidiscrimination laws and to be subject to
discrimination.126 Scholars debate the wisdom of non-waivable
employee rights, with the usual face-off between market enthusiasts
and market skeptics.127 But that normative debate should not distract
from the point that, as a matter of positive law, most employee rights
are not waivable ex ante. Of course, once claims arise, they can be
settled or given up, even before any actual disputation, as with a
severance agreement that waives any existing claims arising out of the
https://www.fidlonlegal.com/files/dubious-workplace-discrimination-cases.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7KS8-3TJ2].
124. More than half of plaintiffs’ attorneys reported in a large survey that the presence
of an arbitration provision tends to discourage them from accepting a case (even relative
to the low percentage of cases they accept in general). Gough, supra note 74, at 121–22.
Given the tiny number of arbitrations actually filed, these self-reports probably understate
the actual impact of arbitration provisions on filing behavior. Indeed, Gough found that, in
addition to those attorneys who reported that they were more likely to reject cases
because of an arbitration clause as such, others acknowledged that lower expected
recoveries in arbitration did affect their decisions. Id.
125. The essentials of this argument are developed in Estlund, supra note 93, at 427–30.
126. See id. at 380.
127. On the pro-contract side, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 358–59 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 947, 982 (1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for
Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1131–37 (1989). For just
two examples of the contract-skeptics, see Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor
Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2787 (1991) and Clyde
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 482–83 (1976).
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employment in exchange for a severance payment beyond what is
contractually due.128 But the relevant rights and liabilities cannot be
waived ex ante.
Imagine now that an employer required employees, as a
condition of employment, to agree that any disputes that arise out of
the employment, including claims of discrimination or other
violations of statutory rights, must be submitted to the company
president for a final and binding decision. That agreement would
presumably be void, for contracting ex ante into a one-sided or sham
process of adjudication—one that offers no fair opportunity to
vindicate one’s rights—is equivalent to a waiver of the underlying
rights.
Obviously, mandatory arbitration is not supposed to be that. It is
supposed to be, and in principle could be, a fair alternative process
for the adjudication of disputes. Under the Court’s very broad
reading of the FAA, the right to litigate future disputes over nonwaivable substantive rights is itself waivable, but only in exchange for
an alternative process for the adjudication of disputes by an impartial
decision maker in which all substantive rights are preserved.129 But
unless the alternative arbitral process does in fact allows for fair and
impartial adjudication, and for the “effective vindication” of
substantive rights, then a mandatory arbitration provision amounts to
an ex ante waiver of those rights.
The condition of “effective vindication” of rights is what ensures
that “arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute
resolution . . . . Without it, companies have every incentive to draft
their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of statutory rights.”130
Unfortunately, that compelling language comes from Justice Kagan’s
powerful dissent in Italian Colors. Until that ruling, the Court’s FAA
decisions appeared to require an opportunity for “effective
128. Ordinarily such a waiver must be “knowing and voluntary.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)
(2012). Under the Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act (“OWBPA”), a valid waiver of
an existing ADEA claim must be “in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of
value to which the [employee] already is entitled,” such as normal severance pay, and it
must be preceded by disclosure of information about the triggering event and sufficient
time to consult with an attorney, among other requirements. Id.
129. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). I have argued
elsewhere that, under the FAA, the right to litigate over non-waivable substantive rights is
only “conditionally waivable”—it is waivable in favor of a fundamentally fair arbitration
process—rather than fully or unconditionally waivable; and that is because unconstrained
waiver of the right to litigate would amount to a waiver of the underlying rights. Estlund,
supra note 93, at 409.
130. American Express Co v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 244 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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vindication” of substantive rights through arbitration.131 Italian Colors
was deeply unsettling in two ways: At a minimum, the decision
diluted the meaning of “effective vindication.” For the majority, an
arbitration provision does not prevent “effective vindication” unless it
actually blocks access to the arbitral forum (like an unreasonably high
arbitrator’s fee) or explicitly denies substantive rights.132 On that
formalistic view, a provision that makes adjudication economically
infeasible (like a bar against aggregation of “negative value” claims)
does not prevent “effective vindication” of rights.133 Even more
disturbing, the Court in Italian Colors seems to have demoted
“effective vindication” from a fixed principle guiding the assessment
of arbitral fairness to something like dicta.134 If mandatory arbitration
is not held to the standard of “effective vindication,” then it will
devolve into—if it is not already—a mechanism for employers’
unilateral dissolution of inalienable substantive rights.
Until recently, the piecemeal nature of the challenges to
mandatory arbitration agreements and the paucity of data had
obscured the cumulative impact of the Court’s decisions and of the
many ways employers can tilt the process in their favor. Since the
early decisions expanding the reach of mandatory arbitration (Gilmer
and Circuit City Stores v. Adams135 in the employment context), the
challenges to arbitration have mostly proceeded one by one: Does
one particular provision prevent fair adjudication of claims? The
Court, often by narrow majorities, has rejected most of those
challenges and relegated nearly all of the challenges that it has
recognized in principle to the arbitral forum itself. Each of those
rulings might be defended given the law and norms of arbitration that
had evolved in the context of disputes between business entities or
between unions and employers. But the cases give no indication that
the Court has ever stepped back and looked at the cumulative effect
of its rulings, and at the mounting evidence on how mandatory
arbitration of employee (and consumer) claims works in practice, to
see whether it does indeed represent a fair quid pro quo relative to
litigation.
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding—in the revealed
preferences of those who are subject to MAAs. There is a kind of
verdict on mandatory arbitration in the thousands of decisions that
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 234–37 (majority opinion).
Id. at 236–37.
See id. at 235.
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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employees and their attorneys make about whether it is worth
submitting a claim to arbitration versus simply abandoning it. For all
but a relative handful of cases per year, the answer appears to be that
it is just not worth it. Somehow the cumulative effect of the Court’s
rulings, given the dominant power of employers to tweak and tilt the
arbitration process to their liking, have made arbitration so
inhospitable to claimants that they routinely give up their claims.
A skeptic might respond: If MAAs did represent a virtual
insurance policy against employment claims—and one that is free, no
less—then why wouldn’t all employers impose such agreements? I
fear that may be exactly where we are headed, albeit more slowly
than one might have expected. And the lag in adoption of MAAs
might be traceable to the obscurity surrounding mandatory
arbitration and the long quest for reliable empirical data on its
impact.
As noted above, after Gilmer opened the door to mandatory
arbitration of employment claims, some early data seemed to suggest
that arbitration was a mixed bag for employers: It tended to produce
more modest and predictable recoveries, but at the cost (to
employers) of greater employee access to the forum and perhaps
more claims reaching a hearing on the merits.136 Moreover, in the
early days of mandatory arbitration it appeared that the lower courts
were rising to the challenge of policing the fairness of MAAs, so that
manifestly skewed arbitration procedures were likely to trigger
litigation, and perhaps be invalidated.137 Many employers might
sensibly have decided to take their chances in court, where they held
familiar advantages. Others—especially small employers without
regular access to sophisticated legal counsel—might simply not have
learned about the arbitration option.
But the arbitration landscape has changed with the Supreme
Court’s drastic constriction of judicial oversight of arbitration and its
presumptive green light to provisions that foreclose aggregate
claims.138 Just since Italian Colors, the evidence suggests that
employers have responded quickly and enthusiastically to the Court’s
invitation to block group claims: A law firm survey found that
employers’ usage of anti-class action provisions in MAAs rose from
136. See Estreicher et al., supra note 51 (manuscript at 7–8).
137. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS U. L.J. 399, 429
(2000).
138. “Presumptive” because the legality of such clauses in employment agreements
under the NLRA is currently before the Court. See supra note 87.
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sixteen percent to nearly forty-three percent just from 2012 to 2014.139
Although anti-class action provisions do not affect all employment
claims, they can obliterate potentially costly group claims at the
virtual stroke of a pen. So why not? That single advantage of
arbitration might indeed be driving the dramatic expansion in the
adoption of MAAs shown by Colvin’s recent survey data.140
The appeal of mandatory arbitration for employers might be
affected by the outcome in this term’s D.R. Horton cases. The shift to
arbitration seems likely to accelerate if the Court reverses the NLRB
and removes the last legal hurdle to employers’ use of MAAs to
preclude aggregate claims. If the Court instead affirms the NLRB and
bars that use of MAAs, some employers might have second thoughts
about arbitration, and some employees will have access to
mechanisms of collective adjudication, either in court or in
arbitration. But emerging data on the miniscule number of
arbitrations that are filed at all—the data that are highlighted here—
underscore the advantages of MAAs for employers even in individual
cases, and might fuel the arbitration juggernaut for years to come.
CONCLUSION
The premise of Gilmer in the crucial domain of employment
discrimination was that arbitration was merely an alternative forum—
more informal but comparably effective—for the vindication of
statutory rights. But Gilmer took a leap of faith on that score, for at
the time there was no evidence on how mandatory arbitration would
actually work when designed by the more powerful party in the highly
asymmetric employment relationship and imposed as a condition of
initial or continued employment. The empirical evidence—or enough
of it—is now in. It now appears that, by imposing mandatory
arbitration on its employees, an employer can ensure that it will face
only a miniscule chance of ever having to answer for future legal
misconduct against employees. Such a provision amounts to a virtual
ex ante waiver of substantive rights that the law declares nonwaivable.
Already in 1996, Professor Katherine Stone described mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreements as the modern equivalent of the
pre-New Deal “yellow dog contracts” by which employees had to

139. See CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, THE 2015 CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT
CLASS ACTION SURVEY 26 (2016), http://www.thenalfa.org/files/2015_Carlton_Class
_Action_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FR6-4K96].
140. See COLVIN, supra note 62, at 7.
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agree not to join a union as a condition of employment: “Today’s
‘yellow dog contracts’ require employees to waive their statutory
rights in order to obtain employment.”141 At the time that conclusion
might have seemed a bit hyperbolic. It was not foreordained that
submission to arbitration would amount to a waiver of substantive
rights. But that now appears to be the cumulative effect of the FAA
jurisprudence on judicial oversight (or lack thereof) of the fairness of
arbitration agreements.
The erasure of substantive rights will be plain for all to see if the
Court allows employers to use MAAs to ban aggregate actions, for
that alone will sound a death knell to most wage and hour claims, and
will confer virtual immunity on firms for those claims.142 But the data
reviewed above show that MAAs function as a virtual death knell for
most employment claims, including the many individual wrongful
dismissal or harassment claims that are not amenable to collective
adjudication and are unaffected by anti-aggregation provisions. The
upshot of the Court’s nearly-unwavering insistence on deferring to
the arbitration “agreement”—that is, to the employer who drafts the
agreement and imposes it as a condition of employment—has been to
swallow up most employment disputes on the way from “naming” and
“blaming” to “claiming,” and before they take shape in a formal
complaint.
It is not clear, and this Article does not venture to say, what
particular combination of changes to the doctrine, if any, could make
mandatory arbitration reasonably hospitable to actual plaintiffs and
their attorneys. Perhaps there is nothing that can be done to ensure
the fairness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the context of the
highly asymmetric employment relationship. Or perhaps the efficacy
of arbitration for claimants could be salvaged by the establishment of
a clear set of minimum standards of fairness for both arbitration
procedures and arbitration providers, with full compliance as a
condition of enforceability.143 In any case, the Court’s FAA

141. Stone, supra note 1, at 1037.
142. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective
Litigation and Arbitration of Employment Rights, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164
(2013) (discussing how collective arbitration is being threatened by the courts and
employers).
143. It would help to require employers to disclose publicly the terms of any
mandatory arbitration agreements to which employees are subject. That would better
enable advocates and scholars to expose and challenge legal defects, and to pressure firms
to live up to legal standards and norms of fair process, outside the context of particular
disputes and apart from the risk-return calculations that govern attorneys’ decisions. See
Estlund, supra note 14, at 427–30.
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jurisprudence so far has done almost nothing to encourage such an
effort. As things stand, the imposition of mandatory arbitration by
employers amounts to a virtual cancellation of employee rights—an
ex ante forced waiver of non-waivable rights.
The FAA is a mere statute—albeit a miraculously muscled up
statute. It is thus open to Congress to either reject the application of
the FAA in some or all employment (and consumer) cases or to
impose more rigorous standards of fairness in such cases. But in the
face of congressional inaction, if not dysfunction, the fate of employee
rights turns on the evolving views of mandatory arbitration in the
Supreme Court. One might hope that the Court’s stubborn insistence
(by the slimmest of margins) on routine enforcement of MAAs stems
from a lag in empirical understanding of their impact on employee
rights. Perhaps the judicial proponents of mandatory arbitration still
hold the view that arbitration entails a fair tradeoff, and allows for the
effective vindication of employee rights.144 In light of what we now
know about the sheer paucity of arbitrations, however, that view can
no longer stand. If the Court continues on its current pro-arbitration
path in the face of this stark reality, it will be complicit in employers’
effective nullification of employee rights and protections.

144. Mandatory employment arbitration has its academic defenders. See, e.g., Waks &
Fidlon, supra note 124, at 1–2. But none has thus far acknowledged and responded to the
emerging empirical evidence on the miniscule number of arbitration claims and the import
for employee rights.
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